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I. INTRODUCTIONON July 22, 2010, Cornelius Dupree (Dupree) was released from
prison and placed on parole.' Eight days later, DNA test results
confirmed that Dupree served thirty years in the Texas prison
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1. Houston Man To Be Declared Innocent After Serving 30 Years For a Dallas Rape
and Robbery He Didn't Commit, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 3,2011), http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Houston ManToBeDeclaredInnocentAfter-Serving_30_Years-
For a DallasRape andRobbery-He-DidntCommit.php.
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system for crimes he did not commit.2 In the state of Texas, Dupree has
served more time in prison than any other innocent individual cleared by
DNA evidence. 3
Dupree's nightmare began in December 1979, when a female, who was
robbed and raped at gunpoint by two men on November 23, 1979, mis-
identified nineteen-year-old Dupree and friend Anthony Massingill
(Massingill) as the perpetrators of the crime.4 At a trial four months fol-
lowing the attack, Dupree and Massingill were again identified as the at-
tackers. 5 Although maintaining his innocence throughout his trial,
Dupree was found guilty of aggravated robbery and assault with a deadly
weapon.6 As a result, Dupree was sentenced to seventy-five years in
prison.7
The tragedy of wrongful conviction and incarceration is twofold: 1) the
person responsible for the crime remains on the streets, potentially harm-
ing others in society, and 2) an innocent person is, all at once, stripped of
his freedom and thrust into the notorious violence and terror of the
prison system. While the true perpetrator of the crime for which Dupree
was convicted and sentenced may never be found, Dupree has at least
been granted his freedom. And Dupree is more fortunate than others in
his position;8 for the thirty years he spent behind bars Dupree is eligible
under Texas statute for compensation of $80,000 per year of incarcera-
tion, plus additional amounts for educational and reintegration
assistance. 9
After thirty years of incarceration, Dupree stands to receive approxi-
mately $2.4 million from the state of Texas-that is-before taxes. The
question of whether this amount qualifies as gross income, and thus is
subject to federal income tax, remains unclear. The taxability of such
payment ultimately hinges on whether the compensation is paid on ac-
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. An astounding 75% of the erroneous convictions that have been cleared with
DNA technology are the result of misidentifications. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The prosecutor did not prosecute Dupree for the rape charges since a convic-
tion would not have added to his sentence. Id.
7. Id.
8. Over 250 individuals have been exonerated by the use of DNA evidence, largely
through endeavors like the Innocence Project. See Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exoner-
ations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts-onPostCon-
victionDNAExonerations.php# (last visited Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Facts on Post-
Conviction DNA Exonerations]. While exonerations have occurred across thirty-four
states, compensation statutes are only found at the federal level, in the District of Colum-
bia, and in twenty-seven states. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PRO-
JECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Compensating-TheWronglyConvicted.
php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Compensating the Wrongly Convicted].
9. Rebecca Terrell, DNA Tests Free Texas Man After 30 Years in Prison, THE NEW
AMERICAN (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.thenewamerican.comindex.php/usnews/
crime/5774-dna-tests-free-texas-man-after-30-years-in-prison; see also TEX. CiV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(1)(2) (West 2011); TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 501.091(b)
(West Supp. 2011).
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count of personal physical injury or physical illness.10 While this determi-
nation seems simple enough, it is an area fraught with uncertainty,
particularly in defining what is, or is not, "physical."'"
Part II of this Comment highlights the disheartening realities of errone-
ous convictions in the United States, including the measures that have
been taken at both the federal and state levels to identify cases in which
DNA evidence may lead to exoneration and, once identified, freeing and
compensating those individuals who have spent time in prison for crimes
they did not commit. Part III addresses the definition of gross income for
federal income tax purposes and the current requirement that compensa-
tion be paid on account of some sort of "physical" harm in order to be
excluded from gross income. Finally, Part IV explores how the classifica-
tion of payments made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals directly dic-
tates their taxability and why such payments should not be subject to
federal income taxation.
II. RIGHTING A WRONG: THE INNOCENCE PROJECT AND
COMPENSATING THE WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED
A. AN INNOCENCE PROJECT
Individuals in the United States have been wrongfully accused, con-
victed, and incarcerated due to a variety of factors, including: eyewitness
misidentification, false confessions (whether coerced or obtained from a
young or developmentally disabled individual), incorrect snitch testimony
(often offered for preferential treatment or deals entered into with the
prosecution), prosecutorial misconduct, and improper forensic evi-
dence. 12 On average, a wrongfully incarcerated individual is convicted at
the age of twenty-seven and spends thirteen years in prison.' 3 In aggre-
gate, wrongfully incarcerated individuals have served approximately
3,524 years in prison. 14
Long before the passage of the Justice for All Act of 2004,15 signed into
law by former President George W. Bush on October 30, 2004,16 a break-
through in DNA testing introduced a scientific means to prove actual in-
nocence of individuals who had been wrongfully incarcerated for crimes
they did not commit.17 Where blood typing had traditionally been the
primary means of identifying or excluding suspects, the "DNA fingerprint
10. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
11. See generally Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 591-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (dis-
cussing the "physical" aspect of a claim for false imprisonment).
12. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
16. See Federal Legislation, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/
Federal-Legislation.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
17. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., WHEN JusrIcE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT
RIGHT: ACTUAL INNOCENCE 52 (2003).
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test" allowed for a more refined means of determining whether or not an
individual had committed a crime. 18 Unfortunately, the "DNA finger-
print test" was only possible in instances where an ample supply of DNA
existed, a rarity at most crime scenes. 19 With Kary Mullis's remarkable
1983 revelation, the polymerase chain reaction, DNA testing was made
possible on much smaller amounts of genetic material, 20 resulting in an
increase of cases where DNA testing was made possible.
The Innocence Project almost exclusively handles cases in which DNA
evidence is available to prove an individual's innocence.21 Since the first
DNA exoneration in 1989, 273 individuals across thirty-four states have
been exonerated through DNA evidence. 22 Of those 273 individuals, sev-
enteen spent time on death row.23 Of the individuals exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing, approximately half have been financially com-
pensated for their wrongful incarceration. 24
B. THE FEDERAL STATUTE
The Justice for All Act of 2004 included the Innocence Protection Act
of 2004 (the Act), which established federal post-conviction DNA testing,
granted incentives for states to consider claims of actual innocence, devel-
oped grants to improve capital representation and prosecution in state
cases, increased compensation in federal cases, and contained congres-
sional encouragement for state compensation statutes.25 More specifi-
cally, the Act allowed an individual to file a motion for DNA testing of
evidence if: 1) the applicant asserted, under penalty of perjury, his or her
innocence of the federal offense or of a separate federal offense if the
evidence was admitted in a federal death sentencing hearing and being
found not guilty of the federal offense would lead to a lesser sentence or
new sentencing hearing, 2) the DNA evidence was secured in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of the federal offense, 3) the evi-
dence to be tested had not already been subjected to DNA testing and
the applicant did not waive his or her right to DNA testing after the en-
actment of the Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 4) the government had
possession of the evidence to be tested at the time the motion was filed
and met specified chain of custody requirements, and 5) the requested
DNA testing was reasonable and consistent with scientific and forensic
practices. 26 Additionally, an individual must present a defense that is not
incompatible with any affirmative defenses previously offered at trial and
18. Id. at 45.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id. at 49.
21. Non-DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/non-dna-exonerations.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
22. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 401-32, 118 Stat.
2260 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
26. Id. § 411.
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that, if proved, would demonstrate his actual innocence. 27 An individual
may similarly file a motion for DNA testing in the case of a state offense
if the individual is able to show that no adequate remedy exists under
state law to authorize DNA testing and the individual has exhausted all
existing remedies under state law in requesting DNA testing.28
Under the Innocence Protection Act of 2004, if the DNA test shows
that the incarcerated individual was not the source of the DNA evidence
at issue, such individual may be entitled to either a new trial or re-sen-
tencing.29 The individual may file a motion for a new trial or re-sentenc-
ing which shall be granted by the court if the DNA test results, when
examined with all the evidence in the case (whether or not previously
introduced at trial), "establish by compelling evidence that a new trial
would result in an acquittal. '30 The acquittal may be of either the federal
offense for which the individual has been incarcerated or another federal
or state offense that was admitted in a federal death sentencing hearing,
the exoneration of which would result in a reduced sentence.3'
The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 enacted other, additional protec-
tions to assist in exonerating innocent individuals from faulty prosecution
and incarceration. Accordingly, the government must maintain biological
evidence obtained during an investigation or prosecution of a federal of-
fense for which an individual is incarcerated. 32 The Act also established
generous grant programs to assist states in managing the costs of post-
conviction DNA testing,33 provided that states meet certain requirements
and allow for post-conviction DNA testing under a state statute, rule, reg-
ulation, or practice comparable to 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) that sufficiently
resolves claims of actual innocence. 34 The Act also provided grants to
states for creating or improving systems to heighten "the quality of legal
representation provided to indigent defendants" who had been charged
with offenses subject to capital punishment.35 Grants were similarly pro-
vided to aid state and local prosecutors in litigating such capital punish-
ment cases, including training programs, legal reform, assessment of
prosecutorial performance, and a systematic review of state death penalty
cases to determine cases for which post-conviction DNA analysis might
be suitable. 36
Perhaps most significant to the discussion at hand, the Innocence Pro-
tection Act of 2004 increased the amount of federal compensation







33. Id. § 412. The Kirk Bloodsworth Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant Program
appropriated $5,000,000 per year for the years 2005 through 2009 for such purpose. Id.
34. Id. § 413.
35. Id. § 421.
36. Id. § 422.
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develop and enact their own compensation statutes in state death penalty
cases.37 The Act increased federal compensation to $50,000 per year of
wrongful incarceration or, in the case of a wrongfully incarcerated indi-
vidual who served time on death row, $100,000 per year.38 The Act ex-
plicitly stated Congress's intent regarding the states: "It is the sense of
Congress that States should provide reasonable compensation to any per-
son found to have been unjustly convicted of an offense against the State
and sentenced to death."' 39 Thus, the Innocence Protection Act of 2004
bolstered federal compensation to the wrongfully incarcerated and pro-
vided clear congressional intent for states to follow suit.
C. STATE COMPENSATION STATUTES
While the federal government, the District of Columbia, and twenty-
seven states have compensation statutes for wrongfully incarcerated indi-
viduals, each jurisdiction differs in its terms and measures of compensa-
tion.40 Although the federal and state statutes differ in eligibility,
methods of payment, timing, and exceptions, the basis (remuneration for
physical injury, lost wages, educational assistance) for each jurisdiction's
compensation system is the focus of a taxability discussion. 41 A brief sur-
vey of the twenty-eight jurisdictions in the United States with compensa-
tion statutes shows the wide variance that exists between the type and
amount of compensation afforded in each jurisdiction.
ALABAMA
Wrongfully incarcerated individuals are entitled to receive $50,000 per
year of wrongful incarceration.42 The Alabama Committee on Compen-
sation for Wrongful Incarceration has the discretion to propose (in the
form of a bill to the state legislature) that an additional amount be
awarded "if circumstances warrant such a supplemental award. '43
CALIFORNIA
Compensation to wrongfully incarcerated individuals is limited to $100
per day of incarceration and requires a showing that the individual sus-
tained pecuniary damages as a result of wrongful conviction and incarcer-
ation.44 The statute specifies that the payment does not constitute gross
income for California state income tax purposes. 45
CONNECTICUT
A wrongfully incarcerated individual may file a claim against the state,
providing evidence of damages arising from "loss of liberty and enjoy-
ment of life, loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, loss of familial rela-
37. Id. § 431-32.
38. Id. § 431.
39. Id. § 432.
40. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 8.
41. See discussion infra Part III.
42. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a) (2006).
43. Id. § 29-2-159(b).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2000).
45. Id.
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tionships, loss of reputation, physical pain and suffering, mental pain and
suffering and attorney's fees and other expenses arising from or related to
such person's arrest, prosecution, conviction and incarceration. ' 46 In de-
termining the amount of compensation payable to an individual, the Con-
necticut Claims Commissioner must also consider damages incurred by
such individual.47 Additionally, compensation may include payments for
employment assistance, tuition for any state institution of higher educa-
tion, and reintegration into society.48
DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA
A wrongfully incarcerated individual may bring a claim against the Dis-
trict of Columbia; the amount of compensation to be awarded is under
the judge's discretion.49 Punitive damages are explicitly excluded from
any compensation awarded.50
FLORIDA
Wrongfully incarcerated individuals are entitled to $50,000 per year of
incarceration plus reimbursement of any court costs, fines, penalties, or
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the wrongfully incarcerated indi-
vidual.51 Remuneration for these amounts may not exceed $2,000,000.52
Wrongfully incarcerated individuals are also entitled (separate from the
$2,000,000 cap) to a tuition and fee waiver for up to 120 credit hours at a
career center, community college, or state university. 53
ILLINOIS
The amount of compensation is at the discretion of the Illinois Court of
Claims, with maximum awards (adjusted annually in accordance with
changes in the Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers) set by
the statute. 54 Additionally, the state provides job search and placement
services to wrongfully incarcerated individuals. 55
IOWA
Compensation available to wrongfully incarcerated individuals is lim-
ited to attorney's and other related fees incurred in connection with the
individual's wrongful conviction and post-conviction relief.5 6 Compensa-
tion also includes $50 per day of wrongful incarceration plus the value of
lost wages (set at a maximum of $25,000 per year) directly related to the
individual's erroneous conviction and incarceration.5 7
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu(b)-(c) (West 2009).
47. Id. § 54-102uu(d).
48. Id. § 54-102uu(e).
49. D.C. CODE §§ 2-421, 2-423 (2001).
50. Id. § 2-423.
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06(1)(a), (c), (d) (West Supp. 2010).
52. Id. § 961.06(1) (flush language).
53. Id. § 961.06(1)(b).
54. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505 / 8(c) (West 2007). The maximum compensation
amounts currently set by statute are as follows: $85,350 for five years imprisonment or less,
$170,000 for imprisonment between five and fourteen years, and $199,150 for imprison-
ment greater than fourteen years. Id. at 505 / 8(c) (West Supp. 2011).
55. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1015 / 2 (West Supp. 2010).
56. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.l(a) (West 2003).




Compensation is set at $15,000 per year, with an aggregate maximum
award set at $150,000.58 At the discretion of the court, additional com-
pensation (up to $40,000) may be granted for "loss of life opportunities"
including one year of job-skills training, medical and counseling services,
and Louisiana state public education or community college tuition.59
MAINE
Damages for wrongful incarceration are limited to $300,000, and puni-
tive damages are specifically excluded by statute.60
MARYLAND
The Maryland Board of Works maintains the discretion to award a
wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individual damages corresponding
to the actual damages sustained by such individual.61 In addition, com-
pensation may include an amount for financial or other counseling.62
MASSACHUSETrs
Total compensation is in the discretion of the judge or jury and is lim-
ited to $500,000.63 In awarding damages, the judge or jury may consider
income the individual would have earned, circumstances surrounding the
individual's conviction, the length and conditions of incarceration, and
any other factors necessary to compensate the individual.64 Damages
may also be awarded for services to deal with physical or emotional issues
directly related to incarceration.65 Furthermore, wrongfully incarcerated
individuals may be entitled to a 50% reduction in tuition for any Massa-
chusetts state or community college.66
Mississippi
A wrongfully convicted individual is entitled to $50,000 per year of er-
roneous incarceration, with a maximum recovery of $500,000.67 The stat-
ute explicitly excludes any compensation awarded to a wrongfully
incarcerated individual from that person's gross income for state income
tax purposes.68
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8H(2) (Supp. 2011).
59. Id. § 572.8H(2)(a)-(c).
60. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242(1), (3) (2003).
61. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (West 2009).
62. Id.




67. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010). The statute provides legisla-
tive intent regarding wrongfully incarcerated individuals in a particularly earnest manner,
stating that such persons "have been uniquely victimized, have distinct problems reenter-
ing society" and "[i]n light of the particular and substantial horror of being imprisoned for
a crime one did not commit, the Legislature intends ... that innocent people who are
wrongfully convicted be able to receive monetary compensation." Id. § 11-44-1.
68. Id. § 11-44-7(3)(c).
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MISSOURI
Compensation is set at $50 per day of post-conviction incarceration for
the crime for which the individual is found innocent.69
MONTANA
Wrongfully incarcerated individuals are entitled to receive educational
assistance including tuition, fees, books, and room and board at any Mon-
tana community college, state university, or tribally-controlled commu-
nity college.70
NEBRASKA
Compensation for wrongful incarceration is based on damages "found
to proximately result from the wrongful conviction" and is limited to a
maximum of $500,000. 71
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Damages awarded to wrongfully incarcerated individuals are set at a
maximum of $20,000.72
NEW JERSEY
Wrongfully convicted individuals are entitled to the greater of: 1) twice
the amount of the individual's income prior to incarceration, or 2)
$20,000 per year of wrongful incarceration.7 3 In addition, damages may
include reasonable attorney's fees. 74
NEW YORK
It is within the court's discretion to "award damages in such sum of
money as the court determines will fairly and reasonably compensate"
the wrongfully convicted and incarcerated individual.75
NORTH CAROLINA
A wrongfully incarcerated individual has a claim against the state for
the pecuniary losses suffered as a result of wrongful incarceration. 76
Compensation of $50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration may be
awarded, not to exceed $750,000 in total.77 A wrongfully incarcerated
individual may be further compensated for any "loss of life opportuni-
ties" in the form of job-skills training and tuition at any North Carolina
public university or community college. 78
69. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 650.058(1) (West Supp. 2011).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(1)(a)-(c) (2009).
71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4604(1), (4) (Supp. 2010). The Nebraska statute, much like
the Mississippi statute, contains strong words of legislative intent. See supra note 67.
Given that claimants have been "uniquely victimized, have distinct problems reentering
society, and have difficulty achieving legal redress... such persons should have an avenue
of redress." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4602. The statute goes further to acknowledge the "par-
ticular and substantial horror" of wrongful incarceration. Id.
72. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14, 11 (2006).
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(a) (West 2009).
74. Id. § 52:4C-5(b).
75. N.Y. JUD. CT. Acrs LAw § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (West 2009).
77. Id. § 148-84(a).




Compensation includes fines, court costs, and reasonable attorney's
fees relating to the criminal proceedings against the wrongfully incarcer-
ated individual, as well as $40,330 (adjusted annually by the state auditor
based on the yearly average of the two prior years' consumer price index)
per year of wrongful incarceration. 79 An individual may also be awarded
lost wages or income suffered as a direct result of wrongful imprison-
ment.80 While an individual may maintain a claim against the state for
wrongful incarceration, the statute "does not affect any liability of the
state or of its employees to a wrongfully imprisoned individual on a claim
for relief that is not based on the fact of the wrongful imprisonment, in-
cluding ... a claim for relief that arises out of circumstances occurring
during.., confinement. '81
OKLAHOMA
Compensation is set at a maximum of $175,000, and punitive damages
are specifically excluded by statute. 82
TENNESSEE
The Board of Claims considers factors such as physical and mental suf-
fering and loss of earnings in determining the amount of compensation
due to a wrongfully incarcerated individual, with a maximum award of
$1,000,000.83
TEXAS
Wrongfully incarcerated individuals are entitled to receive $80,000 per
year of wrongful imprisonment in addition to amounts paid for child sup-
port owed by such individual (the claim for which arose out of their im-
prisonment), including any unpaid interest or arrearages that accrued
during imprisonment. 84 Such individuals may also receive an additional
$25,000 per year spent on parole or as a registered sex offender.85 Addi-
tional compensation is available for tuition (up to 120 credit hours) and
fees at a career center or public institution of higher education,86 as well
as reentry and reintegration services. 87
UTAH
Compensation paid to wrongfully incarcerated individuals is set at the
annual Utah nonagricultural payroll wage (based on the most recent data
at the time of the individual's release) per year of erroneous incarcera-
tion, for a maximum of fifteen years.88
79. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48(E)(2)(a)-(b), 2743.49(A)(1) (West 2008).
80. Id. § 2743.48(E)(2)(c).
81. Id. § 2743.48(F)(3).
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4), (C) (West 2008).
83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
84. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(1)(2) (West 2005).
85. Id. § 103.052(b).
86. Id. §103.054.
87. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 501.091(b) (West Supp. 2010).
88. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405(1)(a) (West 2010).
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VERMONT
At the discretion of the trier of fact, compensation may be set between
$30,000 and $60,000 per year of wrongful incarceration.89 The wrongfully
incarcerated individual may also be entitled to lost wages, reasonable at-
torney's fees, costs related to criminal defense and proving innocence, up
to ten years access to the Vermont Health Access Plan, reintegration ex-
penses, and certain mental and physical health care expenses.90 With the
exception of amounts awarded for attorney's fees, compensation awarded
to a wrongfully incarcerated individual is exempt from Vermont state
taxes. 91
VIRGINIA
Compensation paid to wrongfully incarcerated individuals is set at an
amount equal to 90% of the Virginia per capita personal income (based
on the annual report by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
Department of Commerce) per year of erroneous incarceration, up to
twenty years.92 In addition, up to $10,000 shall be available as compensa-
tion for tuition at a Virginia community college or technical training
institution.93
WEST VIRGINIA
At the discretion of the court, compensation awarded to a wrongfully
convicted person shall be a sum that "the court determines will fairly and
reasonably compensate him."'94
WISCONSIN
Subject to the discretion of the claims board, a wrongfully incarcerated
individual is entitled to compensation "which will equitably compensate"
him, not to exceed $25,000 in total or a rate of compensation greater than
$5,000 per year. 95 The claims board may petition the legislature on a
case-by-case basis for additional amounts if it does not feel the $25,000
allowed by the statute is adequate.96
In the twenty-three states97 that do not have compensation statutes,
wrongfully incarcerated individuals have limited means to remedy the
years spent behind bars.98 While these individuals may be able to bring
common law tort claims, constitutional claims under Section 1983 for
deprivation of liberty, claims for violation of the Fourth Amendment
89. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b) (West 2009).
90. Id. § 5574(b)(1)-(4).
91. Id. § 5574(c)(1).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(A) (West 2007).
93. Id. § 8.01-195.11(C).
94. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (West 2009).
95. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009).
96. Id.
97. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 8. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming lack state compensation statutes for
the wrongfully convicted. Id.
98. See generally Robert W. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, TAX
NOTES, Apr. 21, 2008, at 279-81.
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right against illegal search and seizure, claims alleging violations of the
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, or seek individual, case-by-
case state legislative remedies, such avenues have their own complica-
tions and difficult elements to establish.99 Even if recovery is obtained
through one of these alternative routes, it will likely be based on some-
thing other than the direct, physical injury caused by wrongful
incarceration.
III. DEFINING "PHYSICAL": STADNYK AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDING THE TAXABILITY OF
WRONGFUL INCARCERATION PAYMENTS
A. GROSS INCOME AND DAMAGES
Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 61 broadly defines gross in-
come as "all income from whatever source derived," including a lengthy
but non-exhaustive list of includible items.100 Accordingly, an item is
generally included in gross income unless it has been specifically excluded
under another section of the Code. The Supreme Court has clarified the
sweeping definition of gross income as "instances of undeniable acces-
sions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have com-
plete dominion" and directed that Code Section 61 be given a "liberal
construction . . . in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all
gains except those specifically exempted." 10' The Court added that
"[t]he mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers
as punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character
as taxable income to the recipients."'01 2 Additionally, the mere fact that
an award for damages is compensatory in nature does not exclude it from
gross income.' 0 3 Thus, it reasonably follows that under the general defi-
nition of gross income, damages are includible in income (and, thus, sub-
ject to federal income tax).
99. Id.
100. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). The non-exclusive list includes: "(1) Compensation for services,
including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived
from business; (3) Gains derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6)
Royalties; (7) Dividends; (8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; (9) Annuities;(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts; (11) Pensions; (12) Income
from discharge of indebtedness; (13) Distributive share of partnership gross income; (14)
Income in respect of a decedent; and (15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust."
Id.
101. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955). Although Glenshaw
Glass was decided in 1955, the Supreme Court has continually construed Code Section
61(a) broadly. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995) ("[w]e have repeatedly
emphasized the 'sweeping scope' of this section"), United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
233 (1992) ("[tlhe definition of gross income ... sweeps broadly"), Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367
F. App'x 586, 590 (6th Cir. 2010) ("On multiple subsequent occasions, the Supreme Court
has reaffirmed the 'sweeping scope' of I.R.C. § 61(a).").
102. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
103. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241 (With respect to back-pay settlement awards that were com-
pensatory in nature, the Court held: "[t]here is no dispute that the settlement awards in
this case would constitute gross income within the reach of § 61(a).").
1416 [Vol. 64
When Have They Paid Enough?
Internal Revenue Code Section 104 has historically offered an exclu-
sion from gross income for five areas of compensation for physical injury
or illness. 1°4 Prior to 1996, Code Section 104(a)(2) provided an exclusion
for "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement
and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of per-
sonal injuries or sickness."' 0 5 As part of the Small Business Job Protec-
tion Act of 1996, Congress amended Code Section 104(a)(2) to include
the term "physical.' 10 6 Thus the exclusion became limited to recoveries
for "personal physical injuries or physical sickness."'01 7 While "personal
physical injury" has not been defined, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has indicated that it is akin to "harms such as bruises, cuts, swell-
ing, and bleeding.' 0 8 Hence, the 1996 amendment to Code Section
104(a)(2) legislatively overruled court decisions that excluded from gross
income damages for nonphysical injuries.'0 9 Furthermore, damages re-
ceived under Code Section 104(a)(2) include amounts "received ...
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type
rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution."' " 0 Such exclusion from gross income does not include pu-
nitive damages, 1 ' which therefore remain includible in gross income. Al-
though Code Section 104(a)(2) provides an exclusion from gross income,
it is significant to note that the Supreme Court has adhered to a "default
rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be nar-
rowly construed. 1" 2
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Commissioner v. Schleier estab-
lished a two-prong test applicable to Code Section 104(a)(2).1 3 Relying
on the plain language of Code Section 104(a)(2) and the applicable Trea-
sury Regulations, the Court recognized "two independent requirements
104. See I.R.C. § 104 (2006).
105. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
106. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110
Stat. 1755 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
107. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
108. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000).
109. Polone v. Comm'r, 505 F.3d 966, 969 (2007).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (2011). When damages arise out of a settlement agree-
ment, the "nature of the claim that was the actual basis for settlement controls whether
such damages are excludible under section 104(a)(2)." Hansen v. Comm'r, No. 16247-07,
2009 WL 1139469, at *6 (Apr. 28, 2009) (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237
(1992)). The nature of the underlying claim turns on a factual inquiry. Hansen, 2009 WL
1139469, at *6.
111. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006). See also Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
§ 1605(a).
112. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323,328 (1995) (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 248 (Sou-
ter, J., concurring)). In Burke, the Court held that the back-pay awarded to plaintiffs pur-
suant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (under which damages were limited to
back wages) did not redress a tort-like claim. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241. Thus, given a lack of
the "clear application of 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) as interpreted by the Treasury regulation,"
the award was not excludible under Code Section 104(a)(2). Id. at 248 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
113. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336-37; see also Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 591
(6th Cir. 2010); Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *5.
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that a taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under
§ 104(a)(2)." 1 4 First, the underlying cause of action (ultimately resulting
in recovery) must be "based upon a tort or tort type rights. 11 5 Second,
the recovery must be received "on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness."11 6 Thus, a taxpayer must show that both requirements have been
met before damages qualify for exclusion under Code Section
104(a)(2). 117 Although the Schleier decision pre-dated Congress's 1996
amendment to Code Section 104(a)(2) under the Small Business Job Pro-
tection Act of 1996 (adding the term "physical"), courts have continued
to analyze the application of Code Section 104(a)(2) under the same,
two-pronged analysis. 118 The only difference is that post-1996 decisions
have an arguably added requirement due to the "physical" language ad-
ded by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.119
In determining whether damages have been awarded or a settlement
has been made on account of either 1) a tort or tort-like right, or 2) per-
sonal physical injury or physical sickness, courts often look to the nature
of the relief granted or the specifics of the settlement agreement. 120
Take, for example, the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Burke,
which held that because damages awarded under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 were limited to back wages, such damages did not
redress a tort-like right within the scope of Code Section 104(a)(2).121
Several years after its decision in Burke, the Court held that claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not qualify for
exclusion under Code Section 104(a)(2), as "the ADEA provides no com-
pensation 'for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal
injury.""' 22 The Tax Court has held that damages arising from claims
against the U.S. Postal Service under an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission claim were not excludible since "none of the award was
predicated on personal physical injury or physical sickness."'1 23 Addition-
ally, whether a settlement agreement indicates that any portion of the
114. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
115. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c).
116. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337; see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
117. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
118. See Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 591; Sanford v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-158,
2008 WL 2491676, at *3, (2008); Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *5.
119. Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *6.
120. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334; United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992);
Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 594; Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *6; Sanford, 2008 WL 2491676,
at *3.
121. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241-42.
122. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336. The Court noted "what the Burke Court recognized as
the primary characteristic of an 'action based upon ... tort type rights': the availability of
compensatory remedies." Id. at 335.
123. Sanford, 2008 WL 2491676, at *3. The Tax Court recognized that the emotional
trauma suffered by the taxpayer "manifested itself in physical symptoms such as asthma,
sleep deprivation, skin irritation, appetite loss, severe headaches, and depression." Id.
However, these physical symptoms were not the basis of the award, which was instead
predicated on "sexual harassment, discrimination based on sex, and the failure... to take
appropriate corrective action." Id.
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award is paid on account of physical injury or physical illness may be
indicative of whether courts will treat the payment as qualifying under
Code Section 104(a)(2). 124 According to the Tax Court, "[i]f the settle-
ment agreement lacks express language stating what the amount paid
pursuant to that agreement was to settle, the intent of the payor is critical
to that determination. '125 And while the belief of the payee as to the
purpose of the payment may be pertinent to such inquiry, "the character
of the settlement payment hinges ultimately on the dominant reason of
the payor in making the payment. 126
While punitive damages are rarely excluded from gross income, 127 all
damages resulting from an action that has its origin in a claim for physical
injury or sickness may be excludible even if a portion of the damages do
not directly compensate for a physical injury or sickness.1 28 For example,
damages for loss of consortium arising from the physical injury or physi-
cal sickness of an individual's spouse are excludible from gross income
under Code Section 104(a)(2). 129 Additionally, damages awarded for
emotional distress may only be excludible from gross income if attributa-
ble to a physical injury or physical sickness. 130 Thus, damages awarded
for emotional distress arising from claims such as discrimination or injury
to reputation are not excludible from gross income. 131
Given that damages (with the exception of punitive damages) arising
from a suit for physical injury or physical illness are treated as payments
for physical injury or sickness, it naturally follows that loss of income re-
sulting from physical injury or physical illness is treated similarly. There-
fore, damages received in a suit for personal injury, including an amount
allocable to lost wages as a result of the physical injury or physical illness,
are excludible from gross income.132
B. THE STADNYK APPROACH: FALSE IMPRISONMENT
ISN'T "PHYSICAL"
In Stadnyk v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit recently addressed
whether the physical restraint aspect of a claim for false imprisonment
constitutes "physical injuries or physical sickness" for purposes of deter-
mining whether any damages resulting from such claim would be ex-
cluded from income under Code Section 104(a)(2). 133 Petitioner, Mrs.
124. See Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 594.
125. Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *6.
126. Id.
127. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Punitive damages received in a
wrongful death action may be excluded from gross income if the applicable state law pro-
vides that the only available damages in such action are punitive damages. Id. at 300-01.
128. Id. at 301.
129. Id.
130. Id. The exclusion of such damages is limited to the amount of damages received
not in excess of the amount paid for medical treatment for emotional distress. Id.
131. Id.
132. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50; see also Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
133. See Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 592-94 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Stadnyk, unsatisfied with her purchase of a vehicle, requested that Bank
One place a stop payment order on her check. 134 Rather than placing a
hold on the check for a "dissatisfied purchase," Bank One mistakenly
classified the check as having insufficient funds and returned the check to
the car dealership. 135 The dealership filed a criminal complaint against
Mrs. Stadnyk, ultimately resulting in her February 23, 1997, arrest by the
Fayette County Sheriff's Department. 136 Mrs. Stadnyk "was handcuffed,
photographed,... confined to a holding area... searched via pat-down
and use of an electric wand ... required to undress ... in the presence of
officers, and put on an orange jumpsuit."'1 37 She was released on bail
approximately eight hours after her arrest. 138
Consequent to her arrest, Mrs. Stadnyk filed a complaint alleging "ma-
licious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, defamation,
and outrageous conduct" against the dealership and Bank One.139 Al-
though settlements were reached with both parties of the alleged com-
plaint, Mrs. Stadnyk's $49,000 settlement with Bank One attracted the
attention of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.140 The Commis-
sioner assessed a $13,119 tax deficiency (plus a $2,624 accuracy-related
penalty) against Mrs. Stadnyk for failure to report the $49,000 award on
her 2002 Form 1040.141 With respect to the tax deficiency, the Tax Court
held for the Commissioner, after which Mrs. Stadnyk filed a notice of
appeal.1 42
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the settlement quali-
fied as gross income and, if so, whether it qualified for exclusion under
Code Section 104(a)(2).143 In accordance with the Supreme Court's
broad construction of gross income,'1 44 the Sixth Circuit found that the
$49,000 settlement constituted gross income under Code Section 61(a).145
Thus, the Court recognized that the payment would only escape the reach
of federal income taxation if the payment qualified under a specific
exclusion.146
Analyzing whether the $49,000 settlement payment made by Bank One
to Mrs. Stadnyk qualified for exclusion under Code Section 104(a)(2), the
Sixth Circuit relied on the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court






140. Id. at 589.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 589-94.
144. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
145. Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 590.
146. Id. at 590-91.
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in Commissioner v. Schleier.147 Given that Mrs. Stadnyk's complaint al-
leged various tort claims, such as "malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, false imprisonment, defamation, and outrageous conduct," the court
held that the first prong of the Schleier test was met: Mrs. Stadnyk's un-
derlying claim was based on tort or tort-like rights. 148 With respect to the
second prong of the Schleier test, the statutory requirement that the dam-
ages be awarded on account of personal injury or illness, the Sixth Circuit
held that such requirement was not met.149
In determining that the settlement payment made to Mrs. Stadnyk was
not awarded on account of personal injury or illness, the court first fo-
cused on the 1996 amendment to Code Section 104(a)(2), which "ex-
pressly limit[ed] the type of damages excludable from income to personal
physical injuries or physical sickness." 150 Moreover, the court noted that
during her deposition, Mrs. Stadnyk testified that she did not sustain any
physical injury from her arrest.' 51 The court expressly rejected the argu-
ment that a false imprisonment claim necessarily includes physical re-
straint and that "damages received from false imprisonment arise from
the person's physical loss of their freedom and the mental suffering and
humiliation that accompany this deprivation."'1 52 Accordingly, the court
stated that "the mere fact that false imprisonment involves a physical act
- restraining the victim's freedom - does not mean that the victim is nec-
essarily physically injured as a result of that physical act.' 1 53 The Sixth
Circuit concluded by noting that since the settlement agreement with
Bank One lacked any indication that damages were paid on account of
any physical injury, Mrs. Stadnyk had failed to establish a causal connec-
tion between a physical injury and the settlement.' 54 Accordingly, the
damages awarded on account of Mrs. Stadnyk's erroneous arrest and de-
tainment in the Jessamine County Jail did not qualify for an exclusion
from gross income under Code Section 104(a)(2). 155
C. RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND INTERNAL
REVENUE GUIDANCE
Referred to the Senate Committee on Finance on December 6, 2007,
the Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2007 proposed an amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended), providing
147. Id. at 591. The Schleier Court required that 1) the underlying claim be based on
tort or tort-like right, and 2) that any damages awarded be on account of personal injury or
illness. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995).
148. Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 591-92.
149. Id. at 594.
150. Id. at 592.
151. Id. According to her testimony, "nobody carrying out her arrest put their hands
on her, grabbed her, jerked her around, bruised her, or hurt her." Id. Given the lack of
physical injury, the court found that Mrs. Stadnyk suffered emotional injuries. Id. at 593.
152. Id. at 593.
153. Id.




wrongfully incarcerated individuals full exclusion from gross income of
any compensation related to their wrongful incarceration. 156 The propo-
sal also provided that such individuals would receive a maximum annual
exclusion of $50,000 from gross income as well as a refundable tax credit
for 50% payroll taxes paid on up to $50,000 employment and self employ-
ment income, combined. 157 "Wrongfully incarcerated individuals" in-
cluded individuals who had been convicted of a criminal offense and later
found innocent or pardoned for such offense after serving a portion of
the resulting prison sentence. 158 The proposed legislation disqualified in-
dividuals with previous convictions punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment.' 59 Additionally, the proposed legislation limited the tax
benefits for qualifying individuals to the lesser of fifteen years or the
number of years such individual was wrongfully incarcerated.160 The pro-
posed legislation was not enacted;' 6 ' consequently, compensation paid to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals presumably remained under the
reach of gross income, as defined under Code Section 61,162 unless the
payment could be specifically shown to cover "personal physical injuries
or physical sickness" under Code Section 104(a)(2).163
On September 29, 2010, a slightly modified version of the Wrongful
Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2007 was referred to the Senate Committee
on Finance. 164 The 2010 proposal provided the same tax benefits to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals as the 2007 proposal, but included
one additional caveat: tax benefits granted by the amendment would be
terminated upon conviction of a subsequent offense punishable by more
than one year of imprisonment.' 65 As with the 2007 proposal, no action
was taken on the Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010.166
Similar legislation was proposed to the House Committee on Ways and
Means on September 23, 2008,167 and again on March 3, 2010.168 The
2008 proposal, entitled the Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2008,





161. Bill Summary & Status-ll0th Congress (2007-2008) S.2421, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dllO:SN02421:@@@L&summ2=M&
(last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
162. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). Although not specifically listed as an includible item of gross
income, such compensation qualifies as "all income from whatever source derived" and has
not been specifically excluded by any other section of the Internal Revenue Code. See
generally id.
163. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
164. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010, S. 3892, 111th Cong. (2010).
165. Id.
166. Bill Summary & Status-lllth Congress (2009-2010) S.3892, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESs http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlll:SN03892:@@@L&summ2=M&
(last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
167. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 7021, 110th Cong. (2008).
168. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 4743, 111th Cong. (2010).
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was not enacted into law. 169 The more recent 2010 proposal was identical
to the Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010 referred to the Sen-
ate Committee on Finance.1 70 Like each of the other proposals made to
the Senate and House of Representatives, no action was taken on the
2010 proposed legislation. 171
The most recent glimpse into how the Internal Revenue Service views
payments made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals is included in an
Office of Chief Counsel IRS memorandum dated November 4, 2010.172
The memorandum provides a specific fact pattern: an individual was
wrongfully convicted of a crime and incarcerated for several years before
being exonerated by the state. 173 While incarcerated, the individual suf-
fered physical injuries and sickness.174 Upon his exoneration, the individ-
ual received compensation under state legislation compensating
individuals who were wrongfully incarcerated "for their injuries, sickness,
and economic losses flowing from the physical injuries and physical sick-
ness."1 75 In short, the Office of Chief Counsel concluded that compensa-
tion paid to wrongfully incarcerated individuals for physical injuries and
physical sickness, including amounts received for economic losses flowing
from such physical injury or sickness, is excludible from gross income
under Code Section 104(a)(2).176 This conclusion was tempered by two
qualifications: 1) title, constructive receipt, or economic benefit of the
corpus or assets used to fund future periodic payments may render a por-
tion of future periodic payments taxable, and 2) punitive damages are
included in gross income.1 77
IV. CALL IT INJURY, CALL IT DISASTER
As more and more individuals are exonerated after spending time in
prison for crimes they did not commit, the question becomes whether the
payments made to these individuals, such as those made to Cornelius Du-
pree (who could stand to owe the federal government approximately
$840,000 in taxes), 178 constitute gross income under Code Section 61(a),
and if so, whether such payments qualify for exclusion under Code Sec-
tion 104(a)(2). The "sweeping definition"1 79 of gross income, the Su-
169. Bill Summary & Status-l0th Congress (2007-2008) H.R.7021, http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?dllO:HR07021:@L&summ2=M& (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
170. See H.R. 4743.
171. Bill Summary & Status-lllth Congress (2009-2010) H.R. 4743, http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlll:HR04743:@@@L&summ2=M& (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).






178. Assuming Dupree is paid $80,000 for each of the thirty years he spent behind bars
(resulting in a maximum payout of $2,400,000) subject to the top federal income tax rate
for unmarried individuals of 35%. See I.R.C. § 1 (i)(2) (2006).
179. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229, 233 (1992); Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 590 (6th Cir. 2010).
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preme Court's repeatedly narrow construction of exclusions from gross
income, 180 and the Sixth Circuit's recent holding in Stadnyk v. Commis-
sioner181 intersect to provide a resounding answer: payments made to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals qualify as gross income without quali-
fying for exclusion under Code Section 104(a)(2).
But at what point have the wrongfully convicted and incarcerated indi-
viduals in our society paid enough? On average, wrongfully convicted
individuals who have been exonerated by DNA evidence have been de-
prived of over a decade of their lives.' 82 Upon exoneration, they may, or
may not, be compensated for their time in prison.183 The notion that
those individuals fortunate enough to receive compensation payments
will likely have to pay federal income tax on them demands a fresh look
at either reclassifying such payments or offering a legislative, wholesale
exemption so that wrongfully incarcerated individuals may fully recover
for the years that have been stripped away.
A. PHYSICAL INJURY UNDER CURRENT CLASSIFICATION?
Although compensation payments made to wrongfully incarcerated in-
dividuals are likely taxable under the current construction of gross in-
come, Code Section 104(a)(2) and the recent Stadnyk discussion of false
imprisonment show that fine distinctions exist, which may provide a nar-
row exclusion from federal income taxation. If such payments do not
escape taxation under the current Internal Revenue Code and applicable
Treasury Regulations, they should be reclassified or legislatively ex-
empted to avoid taxation.
As a threshold matter, compensation payments made to wrongfully in-
carcerated individuals almost certainly qualify as gross income under
Code Section 61(a). According to the Supreme Court's broad construc-
tion of Code Section 61(a), 184 compensation payments made under either
federal or state statutes easily fall within the purview of gross income: the
payments constitute an increase of wealth recognized and controlled by
the individual. 185 Whether the payments are deemed to purely compen-
sate wrongfully incarcerated individuals or, alternatively, contain a puni-
tive element against state or federal misconduct, I 86 neither classification
escapes the broad reach of gross income. 187
180. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328 (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 248 (Souter, J., concurring)).
181. See Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 592-94.
182. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 8.
183. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 8.
184. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955); see also Schleier, 515
U.S. at 327; Burke, 504 U.S. at 233; Stadnyk, 367 F. App'x at 590.
185. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430-31.
186. Some jurisdictions specifically exclude punitive damages from any damages
awarded to wrongfully incarcerated individuals. See D.C. CODE § 2-423 (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 (1), (3) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4), (C) (West
2008).
187. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241; Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
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Thus, the next inquiry is whether compensation payments made to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals fall within the exclusion offered by
Code Section 104(a)(2). While the payments may be summarily defined
as gross income, the application of Code Section 104(a)(2), the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Stadnyk v. Commissioner, and the Schleier two-pronged
test are riddled with distinctions that require deeper analysis. Since 1996,
Code Section 104(a)(2) simply requires that damages paid on account of
suit or settlement be made on account of "personal physical injuries or
physical sickness.' 88 It appears deceptively simple that imprisonment
contains an inherently "physical" aspect and thus would qualify for exclu-
sion under Code Section 104(a)(2). If wrongful imprisonment merely
qualified as "physical," the inquiry would end there. Since the compensa-
tion payments made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals would neces-
sarily be on account of a "personal physical injury," all other damages
associated with wrongful incarceration, such as amounts awarded to com-
pensate for loss of earnings, loss of earnings capacity, loss of reputation,
mental pain and suffering, and loss of life opportunities, would likewise
be excludable under Code Section 104(a)(2). 189
Indeed, this is the approach suggested by the November 4, 2010, Office
of Chief Counsel IRS memorandum dealing with compensation payments
made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals. 190 The exclusion of the pay-
ment in the Office of Chief Counsel memorandum was predicated on the
fact that the payment flowed from physical injury or sickness.191 The par-
ticular facts of the memorandum leave open for debate whether pay-
ments that are not specifically predicated on personal physical injury or
illness sustained during incarceration qualify for exclusion under Code
Section 104(a)(2). 192
As evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Stadnyk v. Com-
missioner, defining what qualifies as "physical" may not be as straightfor-
ward as it appears. The court made it clear that in the case of a claim for
false imprisonment, just because the claim involves physical restraint
"does not mean that the victim is necessarily physically injured as a result
of that physical act."'1 93 The court specifically focused on the fact that
Mrs. Stadnyk, a victim of false imprisonment in that case, did not sustain
any outward physical injuries as a result of being physically arrested,
physically removed from her home, and detained in the county jail.194
Compared to a claim for wrongful imprisonment, which likewise entails
an arrest and physical detainment, Stadnyk suggests that unless some per-
sonal physical injury or physical illness is sustained as a direct result of
188. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2
C.B. 50; see also Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
190. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201045023 (Nov. 4, 2010).
191. Id. The facts of the memorandum specifically stated that the individual in question
suffered physical injuries and sickness during his incarceration. Id.
192. See generally id.




being wrongfully incarcerated, the fact that wrongful incarceration is, in
itself, "physical" is not sufficient to bring any resulting compensation pay-
ments under the protective reach of Code Section 104(a)(2).
A glaring difference between false imprisonment and wrongful incar-
ceration likely distinguishes all wrongful incarceration cases from
Stadnyk v. Commissioner: the pervasive theme of violence within the U.S.
prison system.195 Conditions at some prisons have been reported as so
bad that they violated the Eighth Amendment right against "cruel and
unusual punishment. ' 196 During 2004, the U.S. Justice Department re-
ported over 8,000 incidents of rape and sexual abuse behind prison walls,
in some instances instigated and encouraged by prison officers.197 Gang
activity is rampant in the U.S. prison system, often facilitating "drug dis-
tribution, prostitution, and extortion" within the prison. 198 While re-
ported assaults among inmates have historically reached staggering
numbers (in 2000, a reported 8,094 inmates needed medical care as a re-
sult of this kind of violence), there is ample evidence that excessive force
and violence comes from prison guards as well.199 Suffice to say that ex-
treme violence has a profound foothold in the U.S. prison system, a prac-
tical guarantee that most inmates suffer physical injury or illness as a
direct result of their incarceration. This presumption stands in stark con-
trast to the facts in Stadnyk, in which there was evidence that "nobody
carrying out her arrest or detention put their hands on her, grabbed her,
jerked her around, bruised her, or hurt her."'200 The distinction is undeni-
able; it is the difference between an absolute absence of physical harm in
Stadnyk compared to the near certainty of years of sustained physical and
sexual abuse suffered by inmates.
While prison violence is a near certainty, exonerated individuals would
be required to prove to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (presuma-
bly, on review) that they suffered actual personal physical harm during
their incarceration. Furthermore, rather than showing that damages
awarded for non-physical injury (loss of earnings, loss of earnings capac-
ity, loss of reputation, mental pain and suffering, loss of life opportuni-
ties) were directly related to their wrongful incarceration, such
individuals would seemingly have to show that damages for non-physical
injury were a direct result of the physical injury they sustained while in-
carcerated. This argument quickly fails: to argue that an exonerated indi-
vidual's loss of earnings capacity was directly related to a physical assault
he sustained in prison does not muster the requisite casual relationship
required for exclusion under Code Section 104(a)(2). So while wrong-
195. See SURVIVING JUSTICE 332-38, 344 (Lola Vollen & Dave Eggers eds., 2005).
196. Id. at 337. For example, conditions on Missouri State Penitentiary's death row
were considered "cruel and unusual punishment." Id. The accommodations were located
in a "rodent infested basement" with insufficient plumbing and ventilation systems. Id.
197. Id. at 338.
198. Id. at 344.
199. Id.
200. Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 592 (6th Cir. 2010).
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fully incarcerated individuals almost certainly sustain personal physical
injury in prison, only the damages directly relating to such physical injury
would be excluded from taxation, the approach seemingly adopted by the
IRS Office of Chief Counsel. 20 1
More subtle distinctions may be drawn when the Schleier two-pronged
test is applied to determine the applicability of Code Section 104(a)(2). 20 2
The first prong of the test, that the claim be "based upon tort or tort type
right, ' 20 3 is easily satisfied since wrongful incarceration is similar to a
claim for false imprisonment.2°4 The second prong of the test, that the
award be received "on account of personal injuries or sickness," 20 5 may
be satisfied if a wrongfully incarcerated individual can prove that he suf-
fered personal physical injury or illness during his incarceration (and that
the non-physical elements of his compensation payment are on account
of such physical injury or illness).206 Just as courts have often looked to
the nature of the relief awarded or the specifics of a settlement agree-
ment to determine whether an award satisfies the Schleier two-pronged
test,20 7 the federal and state statutes providing renumeration to wrong-
fully incarcerated individuals are useful in applying the Schleier test to
these payments.
The variations among the federal and state statutes that provide com-
pensation payments to wrongfully incarcerated individuals arguably re-
sult in a different application of the Schleier two-pronged test, depending
on the jurisdiction. For example, in the few states that contain specific
statutory language regarding physical injury or conditions, 20 8 the award
arguably arises (at least in part) from the personal physical injury sus-
tained during incarceration. Thus, the award possibly qualifies for exclu-
sion under Code Section 104(a)(2). More commonly, state statutes leave
201. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201045023 (Nov. 4, 2010).
202. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1995). While the two-pronged test in
Schleier was developed prior to the 1996 amendment adding the word "physical" to Code
Section 104(a)(2), the application of the test in this Comment incorporates the "physical"
requirement. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
203. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35(1)(a)-(c) (1965). A successful claim for
false imprisonment may be brought against an individual if the following are shown: "(a)
he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the
actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it."); see also Wood, supra
note 98, at 279-81 (suggesting that wrongfully incarcerated individuals could seek redress
through a tort claim for false imprisonment).
205. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
206. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
207. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334-35; United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992);
Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 367 F. App'x 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2010); Hansen v. Comm'r, No. 16247,
2009 WL 1139469, at *6 (Apr. 28, 2009); Sanford v. Comm'r, No. 20897-051031-07, 2008
WL 2491676, at *3 (June 23, 2008).
208. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu(b)-(c) (West 2009) (damages arising from "physical
pain and suffering"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West Supp. 2011) (dam-
ages awarded "to address any deficiencies in the individual's physical and emotional condi-
tion that are shown to be directly related to the individual's erroneous felony conviction
and resulting incarceration"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2010)
(considering "physical and mental suffering").
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it to the discretion of the appropriate party (i.e., court, committee, jury,
etc.) to award an amount of compensation deemed necessary to compen-
sate the wrongfully incarcerated individual. 20 9 Since these statutes lack
specific language dealing with physical injury or illness resulting from in-
carceration, a wrongfully incarcerated individual would have to prove (on
a case-by-case basis) that the discretionary award was premised on some
physical harm sustained during imprisonment. 210 On the far end of the
spectrum, many of the states with compensation statutes set a daily
award, 211 annual award,212 maximum payout,213 a payout adjusted to re-
flect changes in the Consumer price index or state wage base,214 or a
combination of these measures.21 5 These statutes are most similar to the
cases ruling that an award, none of which was "predicated on personal
physical injury or physical sickness," was not excludible under Code Sec-
tion 104(a)(2). 216 Accordingly, these statutes have the weakest argument
under the two-pronged Schleier test that the awards qualify for exclusion
under Code Section 104(a)(2).
Moreover, compensation awarded in the form of tuition assistance
would likely fail to qualify for exclusion under Schleier. For instance, the
Montana statute limits compensation paid to wrongfully incarcerated in-
dividuals to educational assistance (tuition, fees, books, room and
board).217 Under Schleier, it appears that Montana fails to provide com-
pensation "for any of the ... traditional harms associated with personal
injury. '218 If not excluded under Code Section 104(a)(2), this would in-
evitably leave the wrongfully incarcerated individual with taxable gross
income (in the amount of educational assistance awarded) without any
available cash flow to pay the resulting federal income tax.
209. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a) (2006); D.C. CODE §§ 2-421, 2-423 (2001); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 505 / 8(c) (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572.8H(2) (a)-(c) (Supp.
2011); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (West 2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West Supp. 2011); N.Y. JUD. Cr. AcTs LAW § 8-b(6) (Mc-
Kinney 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
13a(g) (West 2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) West 2009).
210. See Hansen, 2009 WL 1139469, at *6.
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 650.058(1) (West Supp.
2011).
212. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(1)(2)
(West 2005).
213. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242(1), (3) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258D, § 5(A) (West Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4604(1), (3) (Supp. 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14, II (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4),
(C) (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West
2009).
214. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48(E)(2)(a)-(b) (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-9-405(1)(a) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(A) (West 2007).
215. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505 / 8(c) (West Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 663A.(b)(a)-(d) (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8H(2) (Supp. 2011); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(c) (West Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(a) (West 2009);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(a) (West 2009).
216. See Sanford v. Comm'r, Nos. 20897-05, 1031-07, 2008 WL 2491676, at *3 (June 23,
2008).
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(1)(a)-(c) (2009).
218. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 (1995).
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While these nuances and grey areas surrounding the application of the
Stadnyk decision and the Schleier two-pronged test in some cases give rise
to a valid argument that compensation payments made to wrongfully in-
carcerated individuals meet the requirements of Code Section 104(a)(2),
there is the overriding and limiting "default rule of statutory interpreta-
tion that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed. '219 Thus,
it presumably follows that these fine distinctions will not escape narrow
judicial interpretation, and will thus fail to qualify for exclusion under
Code Section 104(a)(2) (ultimately resulting in federal income tax).
B. AN ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATION
Even assuming payments made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals
narrowly qualify for the exclusionary treatment offered by Code Section
104(a)(2) according to the above analysis, the area remains burdened by
uncertainty. Without clarification, the law in this area is left to develop in
a piecemeal fashion,220 possibly leaving some exonerated individuals with
a hefty tax bill. Legislation exempting compensation paid to wrongfully
incarcerated individuals from gross income has been proposed twice
before the Senate Committee on Finance 221 and twice before the House
Committee on Ways and Means:222 none of the proposals were adopted.
The IRS has continued to premise exclusion on whether the damages
awarded to the exoneree arose from personal physical injury.223 So while
congressional intent remains vague, the IRS appears to be more than
willing to tax wrongful incarceration recoveries to the extent they are not
on account of personal physical injury or illness.
On the other hand, some (albeit, slight) state legislative action supports
the exclusion from income of payments made to wrongfully incarcerated
individuals. Certain state statutes providing compensation payments to
wrongfully incarcerated individuals specifically exempt such payments
from the state's income tax.224 Even in several states that do not exempt
the payments from state income taxes, the statutes themselves contain
poignant language with respect to the particular trials faced by wrongfully
incarcerated individuals: wrongfully incarcerated individuals have been
"uniquely victimized" and thus should be entitled to a remedy given the
"particular and substantial horror" of their experience.225
219. Id. at 328 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
220. Robert W. Wood, Wrongful Imprisonment Tax Ruling Stirs Controversy, FORBES
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:24 AM), http:/Iblogs.forbes.com/robertwood/2010/11/17/wrongful-
imprisonment-tax-ruling-stirs-controversy/.
221. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2007, S. 2421, 110th Cong. (2007); Wrong-
ful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010, S. 3892, 111th Cong. (2010).
222. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 7021, 110th Cong. (2008);
Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 4743, 111th Cong. (2010).
223. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mer. 201045023 (Nov. 4, 2010).
224. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(c) (West
Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(c)(1) (West 2009).




While state and federal legislative intent remains unclear with respect
to the taxability of compensation payments made to wrongfully incarcer-
ated individuals, one thing remains clear: exonerees have paid enough
and should not be subject to federal income tax on these payments. One
viable solution is federal congressional action-passage of legislation sim-
ilar to the Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2010 (or any of the
other similar pieces of proposed legislation). This wholesale exclusion
would simply remove compensation payments made to wrongfully incar-
cerated individuals from gross income.2 26
A second solution is to reclassify payments made to wrongfully incar-
cerated individuals: the payments are more similar to disaster relief pay-
ments than a tort claim award or settlement. Imagine life, like Cornelius
Dupree, abruptly cut short at the age of nineteen. Imagine life subject to
what might constitute some of the most abhorrent and violent conditions
sanctioned in the United States today - the prison system. Imagine thirty
years spent living in such conditions. All of these injustices are on ac-
count of any number of missteps within the criminal justice system: eye-
witness misidentification, false confessions, incorrect snitch testimony,
prosecutorial misconduct, improper forensic evidence, 227 but not on ac-
count of any personal wrongdoing. How is this not a disaster?
Internal Revenue Code Section 139(a) excludes any amount paid to an
individual "to reimburse or pay reasonable and necessary personal, fam-
ily, living, or funeral expenses incurred as a result of a qualified disas-
ter. ' 228 While not the September 11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina,
a severe earthquake, or similar large-scale tragedy, the approximately
3,524 cumulative years served in prison229 by wrongfully incarcerated in-
dividuals reflects a more personal disaster. The broad definition of a
"qualified disaster" includes that "which is determined by an applicable
Federal, State, or local authority.., to warrant assistance from the Fed-
eral, State, or local government or agency or instrumentality thereof. '230
Like application of Code Section 104(a)(2), exclusion for wrongful incar-
ceration compensation payments under Code Section 139 would be con-
strued as "a matter of legislative grace" which is "narrowly construed
against the taxpayer."' 231 Thus, this remedy too would require specific
legislative action to define wrongful conviction and incarceration as a
"qualified disaster." Whether granted their own, wholesale exclusion
from gross income or qualified as compensation for a disaster of sorts,
payments made to wrongfully incarcerated individuals demand legislative
action to avoid federal income taxation.
226. See S. 2421; S. 3892; H.R. 7021; H.R. 4743.
227. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 8.
228. I.R.C. § 139(b)(1) (2006).
229. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 8.
230. I.R.C. § 139(c)(4) (2006). A "qualified disaster" also includes destruction caused
by terrorism or military action, a federally declared disaster, and disaster concerning a
common carrier. Id. § 139(c)(1)-(3).
231. Estate of Kalahasthi v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored the exoneration and release of innocent
individuals from federal and state prison systems through the use of DNA
evidence and endeavors like the Innocence Project. Moreover, this Com-
ment has surveyed the federal and state compensation payments availa-
ble to wrongfully imprisoned individuals. It has examined the current,
unsettled federal income tax treatment of these payments (where availa-
ble), ultimately concluding that, in the current environment, such pay-
ments are fully taxable.
But given the price innocent individuals have paid, and the fundamen-
tal rights they have had stripped away, when have they paid enough?
Rather than purely relying on the strict construction of exclusions from
gross income and the Stadnyk definition of "physical," which combine to
yield a less than ideal result, specific legislative action is needed. Con-
gressional intervention is overdue and necessary in order to ensure that
wrongfully incarcerated individuals stop paying, and start living, when
they walk out of the prison doors-for the last time.
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